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Abstract. The focus of the paper is on Rein Vihalemm’s novel approach to science called practical realism. 
From the perspective of Vihalemm, science is not only theoretical but first and foremost a practical activity. 
This kind of approach puts chemistry rather than physics into the position of a typical science as chemistry has 
a dual character resting on both constructive-hypothetico-deductive (ϕ-science) and classifying-historico-des-
criptive (non-ϕ-science) types of cognition. Chemists deal with finding out the laws of nature like the physicists. 
However, in addition to this they deal with substances or stuff that is rather an activity typical to natural history. 
The analysis of the dual character of chemistry brings about the need to analyse philosophically the reasons 
why physics has held the position of the only science proper so far. The comparative analysis of physics and 
chemistry at the basis of practical realism suggests that it is chemistry rather than physics that should hold a 
special position among sciences. Perhaps we should exchange ϕ-science for χ-science.
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Nuo dvejopos chemijos prigimties prie praktinio realizmo ir atgalios:  
R. Vihalemmo mokslo filosofija 
Santrauka. Straipsnyje susitelkiama į vadinamąjį praktinį realizmą – naujovišką Reino Vihalemmo prieigą 
prie mokslo. Pagal Vihalemmą, mokslas nėra tik teorinis, bet pirmiausia ir daugiausia – praktinis užsiėmimas. 
Tokia traktuotė vietoje fizikos kaip tipinį mokslą iškelia chemiją, nes ji esanti dvejopo pobūdžio: konstruk-
tyvus-hipotetinis-deduktyvus mokslas (ϕ mokslas) ir tuo pat metu – klasifikacinis-istorinis-deskriptyvus 
mokslas (ne ϕ mokslas). Chemikai aiškinasi gamtos dėsnius taip pat kaip ir fizikai. Vis dėlto kartu jie dirba ir 
su medžiagomis, su konkrečiais daiktais, o ši veikla yra labiau gamtos istorijos užsiėmimas. Chemijos kaip 
dvejopo mokslo analizė iškelia poreikį filosofiškai išaiškinti priežastis, dėl kurių fizika iki šiol laikoma vienin-
teliu tikruoju mokslu. Praktiniu realizmu grindžiama lyginamoji fizikos ir chemijos mokslų analizė rodo, kad 
veikiau chemija nei fizika turėtų užimti ypatingą vietą tarp mokslų; galbūt ϕ mokslas turėtų pakeisti χ mokslą.
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The leading Estonian philosopher of science Rein Vihalemm was the Editorial Board 
member of Problemos for many years. In summer of 2015, Vihalemm died in a tragic 
boating accident at the age of 76. Vihalemm was a chemist by his background but changed 
to philosophy of science soon after graduating from the University of Tartu with a diplo-
ma in chemistry. However, Vihalemm started his career as a historian of chemistry first 
by publishing the book “A Story of a Science” (Vihalemm 1981). The book has recently 
been translated into English and published as a special edition of the journal Acta Baltica 
Historiae et Philosophiae Scientiarum (Vihalemm 2019). 
In a way, one might claim that philosophy of chemistry started from this book. In 
addition to telling the main facts and explaining the main theories of chemistry in the 
historical order, Vihalemm offers a deep analysis about why we cannot consider alchemy a 
science but rather a cultural phenomenon of its age and how does it differ from chemistry 
as a science. Our suggestion is that it is exactly this point where Vihalemm developed the 
very basic ideas of his later philosophy of science and of chemistry. 
In the current paper, we shall address one by one the main original contributions of 
Vihalemm to philosophy. The first one was a novel solution of the most fundamental 
problem of the philosophy of science – the problem of demarcation. The next one would 
be finding out and describing the dual nature chemistry. The most important contribution 
of Vihalemm, however, is the new account of science that he called practical realism. 
Unfortunately, an untimely death did not allow him to fully develop this interesting 
approach. However, Vihalemm managed to show that practical realism might serve as a 
basis for changing the course of the whole philosophy of science, challenging the position 
of physics as the only science proper (Vihalemm 2015).
The Problem of Demarcation and the Model of Science
The background of the problem of demarcation is common knowledge in philosophy of 
science as well as its classical solutions, verification and falsification. Both of them work 
for distinguishing science from non-science. However, these solutions raise numerous 
problems that are again well known and widely discussed in the philosophy of science. 
All this motivated Vihalemm to deal with the problem of demarcation on his own and to 
present an original solution. 
Vihalemm took off from distinguishing between two types of cognition, construc-
tive-hypothetico-deductive and classifying-historico-descriptive (Vihalemm 2001). 
Science, in the narrow sense of the term, is the cognitive activity based on the construc-
tive-hypothetico-deductive type of cognition. The concept of hypothetico-deductive has 
been in use for a long time. William Whewell is normally credited as its founder, although 
the case is not conclusively clear. Where ‘constructive’ comes from and what does it mean? 
According to Vihalemm, the scientist does not have access to the world as it is from the 
so-called God’s-eye point of view. She has to construct the research object for herself 
from the basis of her own cognitive capacities. This sounds like Kantian apriorism and 
perhaps is really close to that classical view in philosophy. However, there is still a big 
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difference with Kant’s position. It is not just human cognition, which is at work during 
doing research. Reality is there as well and plays its direct role. The researcher has no 
access to reality as it is but is still in contact with it. The researcher cannot construct any 
kind of research object from her own deliberation because reality will resist. 
If we raise the question what kind of really existing science is of the constructive-hy-
pothetico-deductive type, then would the response be physics? At least it is the closest to 
the type. However, perhaps just classical mechanics falls for more or less fully under the 
category. Physics is a living and developing science and therefore is not fit for playing the 
role of the model for the whole science. This is the reason why Vihalemm created the ideal 
model of science that he called ϕ-science. The latter is a cognitive activity that relies fully 
on the constructive-hypothetico-deductive type of cognition. It adheres to the Galilean 
methodology. The major parts of the latter are formulating a testable hypothesis about a 
constructed research object or a relation, testing the hypothesis by means of reproducible 
experiments and expressing the result in the language of mathematics.
The key term in this classical approach to the methodology of science is reversi-
bility. Time does not have any meaning in classical physics and actually, not even in 
the non-classical one. Irreversibility as an objective phenomenon comes in only in the 
post-non-classical science as Stepin (2005) called it. By this term, Stepin mostly means 
the work of Ilya Prigogine on dissipative structures (Prigogine, Stengers 1984, 1997). 
However, synergetics initiated by Hermann Haken as well as bifurcation theory, chaos 
theory, etc. also fall under this category. Reversibility does not fit in with these approaches. 
Let us stress that the irreversibility introduced here is an objective one not the subjective 
irreversibility we all experience through our senses on a daily basis. The objective nature 
of irreversibility in the approach of Ilya Prigogine has been explained, for instance, in a 
paper by Näpinen and Müürsepp (2002). 
From our current perspective, it is important to notice that post-non-classical physics 
is not fully a ϕ-science any longer. This is why Vihalemm could not refer just to phys-
ics as the ideal model of science. The recent developments in physics indicate that its 
nature is changing and it does not adhere to the model in each and every respect and 
detail. By the same reason, Stepin could not just refer to Prigogine or his methodology 
of self-organization but had to coin the term ‘post-non-classical science’. There are other 
approaches of the same type as well, not just Prigogine’s. Let us also point out that Ilya 
Prigogine was also a chemist at least as much as he was a physicist. The Nobel prize was 
awarded to him in chemistry. The disciplinary boundaries between physics and chemistry 
are blurred in his work.
By all evidence, the model of ϕ-science makes sense and works. Science that is based 
on the classifying-historico-descriptive type of cognition Vihalemm calls non-ϕ-science. 
Everything that has classically been called natural history falls under this category. The 
broad understanding of science includes both ϕ-science and non-ϕ-science. In addition, 
there is still social science of course. There is no normative assessment of different sciences 
and different types of cognition here. Just the major differences have been pointed out. 
We cannot say that knowledge provided by physics is necessarily better in every respect 
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rather than, for example, geographical or sociological knowledge. However, knowledge 
provided by ϕ-science is the most exact and objective one. Here, the subjective role of 
the researcher is pushed to the minimum. However, it is still never missing as we’ll see 
below in the context of practical realism. 
The Dual Character of Chemistry 
We saw in the previous chapter that classical physics adheres to the model of ϕ-science but 
even physics in its post-non-classical version does not do so fully. However, what about 
chemistry? Should it be considered a ϕ-science or rather a non-ϕ-science? The response 
to this question has been developed by Vihalemm in many of his research papers (1999, 
2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2004, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2011a, 2016). Vihalemm offered solid 
ground for considering chemistry a science of dual character. The list of Vihalemm’s 
publications on the topic given here is not exhaustive. He has addressed it in several other 
works as well but there the issue of the dual character of chemistry has not occupied the 
centre ground. Some other authors have discussed the same or similar issues concerning 
chemistry as well (Bensaude-Vincent, Simon 2008), (Müürsepp 2004).
In order to follow the thread, we have to introduce another notion – physics-like sci-
ence. It can be taken almost as a synonym to ϕ-science. However, we must keep in mind 
that there may be physics-like science, dealing with self-organization for instance, that 
is not purely ϕ-science. 
What does the dual character of chemistry actually mean? Based on what has been said 
above, it is perhaps obvious that the idea has to be that chemistry is partly a ϕ-science and 
partly a non-ϕ-science. Chemistry is physics-like to some extent beyond any reasonable 
doubt. Just like physics, chemistry also aims at finding out regulations in nature that can 
be called laws. However, this is not what the whole chemistry is about. Chemistry also 
deals with substance or stuff. This raises the question whether the physics-like part of 
chemistry is not just physics-like but actually belongs to physics. We are going to show, 
however, that this would not be an appropriate interpretation of chemistry.
Let us take a look at the most famous law of chemistry, the law of periodicity of Dmitri 
Mendeleev. We cannot possibly do without this because the year 2019 has been proclaimed 
official year of the periodic table by UNESCO commemorating the one hundred and fifty 
years anniversary of Mendeleev’s discovery. The discovery of the periodicity law is a very 
good example of applying the constructive-hypothetico-deductive type of cognition. The law 
is about the chemical elements. However, what is a chemical element after all. Vihalemm puts 
it like this: ”[a] fundamental idealisation substantiated by experimental chemistry – namely, 
a definite position in the periodical system based on the periodic law” (Vihalemm 2015: 
111). Thus, the periodicity law rests on the constructed objects called chemical elements 
that have been specified with the help of the law itself. Still, the result is not anything like 
an arbitrary construction of the human mind but a real regularity of nature. The law rests on 
the constructive activity combined with experimental support. It expresses a real objective 
relationship. However, there is no need for the mathematical expression of the result except 
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for giving the number of the atomic weight. The periodicity law is not a law of physics. It 
is a law of chemistry. The story of the law of periodicity shows that part of chemistry is a 
ϕ-science type of activity. It is physics-like but it cannot be reduced to physics.
It is obvious, however, that looking for the laws of nature is not the only activity of 
chemists. They are also dealing with substances or stuff. This is definitely not a con-
structive-hypothetico-deductive but a classifying-historico-descriptive type of cognitive 
activity. More than that, the non-ϕ-science side of chemistry is a clearly practical, results 
oriented scientific activity. However, the case of chemistry is even more interesting. We 
need not look at the ϕ-science and non-ϕ-science side of chemistry as done separately 
and at different times. They can co-exist in perfect cooperation. Bensaude-Vincent and 
Simon observe: ”Indeed, we want to place special emphasis on this idea that theory and 
substance are co-produced by the chemist in the laboratory” (2008: 6). In a way, even 
the periodicity law was produced in a laboratory. Chemistry is really a practical science 
(Müürsepp 2016). There is still more. Based on its practical nature, chemistry can also 
be called a technical science. Again, Bensaude-Vincent and Simon help us to understand 
the idea: “[C]hemistry serves as the archetypical techno-science unable to restrict itself 
to the high-ground of pure theory, but always engaged in productive practice. When we 
look back to past philosophers like Denis Diderot or Gaston Bachelard, we can see that the 
idea that there are two kinds of science, theoretical and practical is nothing new. [...] Ne- 
vertheless, in the course of the last two centuries, the rise of modern physics has promoted 
pure theory over other forms of science, making it natural to characterize those that rest at 
the level of practice as impure if not degenerate” (2008: 5). If Vihalemm’s understanding 
of chemistry tends to separate it into two parts then the approach of Bensaude-Vincent 
and Simon keeps chemistry together but emphasizes its impure character. However, the 
impurity of Bensaude-Vincent and Simon and the dual character pointed out by Vihalemm 
are the same thing in essence. This is the position of Vihalemm himself as well (2015). 
Under the strong influence of the dual character of chemistry the authors of both ap-
proaches have called their general positions different kind of realisms. In the next section, 
we focus at Vihalemm’s practical realism but pay some attention to the operational realism 
of Bensaude-Vincent and Simon as well.
Practical Realism
As a continuation to presenting an original solution of the problem of demarcation and 
explaining the dual character of chemistry, Vihalemm worked out his own general account 
of science that he called practical realism. This happened roughly at the beginning of the 
second decade of this century. Let us first give the main theses of practical realism and 
then explain the background in more detail: 
“1. Science does not represent the world “as it really is” from a god’s-eye point of 
view. Naïve realism and metaphysical realism have assumed the god’s-eye point 
of view, or the possibility of one-to-one representation of reality, as an ideal to be 
pursued in scientific theories, or even as a true picture in the sciences.
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2.  The fact that the world is not accessible independently of scientific theories – or, 
to be more precise, paradigms (practices) – does not mean that Putnam’s internal 
realism or “radical” social constructivism is acceptable.
3.  Theoretical activity is only one aspect of science; scientific research is a practical 
activity and its main form is the scientific experiment that takes place in the real 
world, being a purposeful and critical theory-guided constructive, as well as ma-
nipulative, material interference with nature.
4.  Science as practice is also a social-historical activity which means, amongst other 
things, that scientific practice includes a normative aspect, too. That means, in turn, 
that the world, as it is accessible to science, is not free from norms either.
5.  Though neither naïve nor metaphysical, it is certainly realism, as it claims that 
what is “given” in the form of scientific practice is an aspect of the real world. Or, 
perhaps more precisely, science as practice is a way in which we are engaged with 
the world” (Lõhkivi, Vihalemm 2012: 3).
This is a somewhat elaborate version of the theses. Probably the first version of the 
five theses was given by Vihalemm one year earlier (2011b). Later on he has elaborated 
the account in several other papers (Vihalemm 2012, 2013, 2015). Practical realism has 
definitely been mentioned in some more publications by Vihalemm. The first paper about 
practical realism (Vihalemm 2011b) is especially valuable because there he points out 
all the major influences he had experienced that have motivated him to present his own 
account, called practical realism. Let us take a look in a more or less historical order.
There is no news that Vihalemm, as all academic people of his age in the Baltics, 
received his education in the academic milieu of the Soviet Union. Although philosophy 
in the USSR was not homogenous, it is well known that from the official point of view 
Marxism-Leninism was the only correct philosophy in the country. There were philosoph-
ical communities, like the Moscow logical circle, that did not belong to Marxism strictly 
speaking. However, even such rare exceptions were under the influence of Marxism. There 
were individuals in the Soviet Union and the satellite states who did not take Marxism 
seriously and contributed directly to the international scene of the philosophy of science.
Still, every individual who was active in philosophy in the USSR had at least to pre-
tend to be a Marxist. In Estonia, however, the philosophers developed something that 
later on has obtained the name ‘foreword Marxism’. As the term suggests, the approach 
meant that Marxist views supported with relevant quotes form Marx, Engels and Lenin 
were presented just in the forewords of philosophical texts and later on, the authors of-
ten diverged quite far from Marxist orthodoxy. The tactics worked because the censors 
rarely cared to read more of philosophy texts than just the forewords. The philosophers 
of science, however, even managed to take their own advantage from the requirement 
to base their considerations on Marxism (Mets 2019). First of all this concerned Karl 
Marx’s conception of practice. The conception need not be looked at in the context of 
stimulating social change although that was probably Marx’s predominant idea. Actually, 
his considerations on practice have a much wider significance. 
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The major source of Marx’s approach to the understanding of practice are his theses on 
Feuerbach, especially the first two ones. In the first thesis Marx writes: “The main defect 
of all hitherto-existing materialism—that of Feuerbach included—is that the Object [der 
Gegenstand], actuality, sensuousness, are conceived only in the form of the object [Objekts], 
or of contemplation [Anschauung], but not as human sensuous activity, practice [Praxis], 
not subjectively. Hence it happened that the active side, in opposition to materialism, was 
developed by idealism—but only abstractly, since, of course, idealism does not know real, 
sensuous activity as such. Feuerbach wants sensuous objects [Objekte], differentiated from 
thought-objects, but he does not conceive human activity itself as objective [gegenständliche] 
activity. In The Essence of Christianity [Das Wesen des Christenthums], he therefore regards 
the theoretical attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and 
defined only in its dirty-Jewish form of appearance [Erscheinungsform]. Hence, he does not 
grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary’, of ‘practical-critical’, activity“ (Marx 1845). We 
must not be disturbed by the reference to the revolutionary here. Although Marx probably 
understood it from the position of the social change, the revolutionary can well be taken 
from the point of view of understanding science and the philosophy of science as practice 
rather than just a sterile conceptual analysis of scientific terms and their connecting relations. 
This is how the foreword Marxists took the point. 
Marx’s position on practice is even more clearly there in the second thesis: “The 
question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of 
theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth, i.e., the reality and power, 
the this-sidedness [Diesseitigkeit] of his thinking, in practice. The dispute over the reality 
or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question” 
(Marx 1845). Again, we must admit that the quote has a deep meaning in the philosophical 
understanding of science. Overwhelmingly theoretical, even scholastic, attitude has been 
dominating in science way too long. The reason for this has probably been the model role 
of physics and the praising of the theoretical side of it that actually started with Galileo 
already. Shifting the focus towards chemistry might be a quite healthy tendency. Vihalemm 
has repeatedly emphasized being influenced by Marx’s treatment of practice, concerning 
the understanding of the development of science of course. There is nothing to be surprised 
about if we remember that Vihalemm is a chemist by his basic qualification.
It is quite obvious that this is chemistry rather than physics that serves as the model 
science from the point of view of practical realism, although Vihalemm has never put 
it in such a straightforward way. However, let us see, which other approaches that have 
influenced Vihalemm on his journey towards practical realism. At least as strong influence 
as the Marxist one comes from the practical approach to the philosophy of science of 
Joseph Rouse. A nice brief explanation of Rouse’s approach appears in his own works: 
“[t]he question is not how we get from a linguistic representation of the world to the world 
represented. We are already engaged with the world in practical activity, and the world 
simply is what we are involved with. The question of access to the world, to which the 
appeal to observation was a response, never arises. The important categories for charac-
terizing the ways the world becomes manifest to us are therefore not the observable and 
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unobservable. We must ask instead about what is available to be used, what we have to 
take account of in using it, and what we are aiming toward as a goal” (Rouse 1987: 143). 
In addition to the stress on practice, Rouse is emphasizing the lack of the need for any 
metaphysics in science. Vihalemm is aiming at the same attitude with his practical realism. 
This makes his position controversial. We’ll get back to this issue below.
There are other thinkers, whose ideas influenced the views of Vihalemm. First, there 
is ‘the pragmatic realism’ developed by Sami Pihlström (Pihlström 1996, 2008: 26-69). 
Pihlström has shown that pragmatist philosophy of science can be interpreted as a version 
of realism. There is more Finnish influence coming from perhaps the most well-known and 
influential living philosopher of science in Finland Ilkka Niiniluoto. His critical scientific 
realism (Niiniluoto 1999) has made an impact on Vihalemm as he admits. 
Now comes the controversy. It is connected to the approach to the understanding of 
science of Nicholas Maxwell. Large part of Maxwell’s life work has been dedicated to the 
criticism of the commonly accepted approach to science that he calls standard empiricism 
(SE) and promotion of a different kind of approach that Maxwell calls aim-oriented empir-
icism (AOE). The core of the problem is that, according to Maxwell, scientists have firmly 
adopted the approach that no statement should be included into science independently 
of evidence. In reality, however, scientists constantly make metaphysical assumptions. 
They presume that the universe is comprehensible, prefer unified theories over disunified 
ones and simple theories over more complicated ones, even if there are infinitely many 
disunified and/or complicated rival theories that are empirically more successful. Thus, 
metaphysical assumptions are actually inherent components of science and this has to 
be recognized. This recognition would mean changing from SE to AOE. Maxwell has 
presented his criticism of SE and promotion of AOE in very many publications. Just two 
years ago, however, the most systematic treatment appeared (Maxwell 2017). 
The controversy is connected to the acknowledgement of the role of metaphysics in 
science. Vihalemm has pointed out that Maxwell’s criticism of SE meets with approval in 
the context of practical realism (2011b). On the other hand, however, Vihalemm does not 
recognize the need for the metaphysical assumptions in science. This attitude of Vihalemm 
stretches back quite far. Vihalemm has adhered to the naturalist approach to philosophy of 
science proclaiming philosophy of science without philosophy (1993). The same tendency 
is clearly visible in the five theses of practical realism. There is a strong emphasis on the 
normative aspect of science there but there is no place for metaphysics. The not reachable 
part of the world is not the metaphysical unobservable for Vihalemm. The point should 
rather be understood in Joseph Rouse’s way as being in contact with reality in a certain 
way, the only possible one according to Rouse and Vihalemm.
One clearly pointed out issue in the five theses of practical realism asks for clarifi-
cation. It is the reference to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam. Just like Vihalemm, 
Putnam also denied the God’s-eye view capacity to the human observer. That is why he 
could not agree with metaphysical realism and proposed his own approach. However, 
there is an important question here. In what respect is practical realism different from 
internal realism? It has to be different because internal realism is not even acceptable for 
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Vihalemm. Putnam explains metaphysical realism as follows: “What the metaphysical 
realist holds is that we can think and talk about things as they are, independently of our 
minds, and that we can do this by virtue of a “correspondence” relation between the terms 
in our language and some sorts of mind-independent entities” (Putnam 1982: 141-167). 
According to Putnam, such kind of correspondence cannot be substantiated. However, 
what does internal realism provide in replacement? The world is independent from the 
human mind but the structure of the world is still prescribed by the human mind in a way. 
A quite Kantian position. We cannot say that practical realism is free of Kantianism. How-
ever, there is really no requirement that the human mind has to prescribe something to the 
world. The researcher just exercises contact with the world (remember Rouse again). Here, 
information that the researcher receives from reality is structured according to the sensual 
capacity we humans have. Kant comes in at this point. The ‘prescription theory’ makes 
internal realism something else rather than realism altogether, a kind of constructivism.
Practical realism also proclaims social constructivism unacceptable. The corresponding 
explanation by Vihalemm is clear and straightforward. Social constructivism, at least in 
its radical form, is self-refuting since social constructivist views are also constructions 
(Lõhkivi, Vihalemm 2012: 3). In addition, social constructivism contradicts common 
sense. We cannot construct anything we like as reality resists (Lõhkivi, Vihalemm 2012: 3).
Quite obviously, it is chemistry, rather than physics that works best as a model field 
for a practical realist account of science. By this reason, accepting practical realism might 
even shift the focus of the whole philosophy of science. For more than a century, the latter 
was undisputedly physics centred. Chemistry very seldom achieved any special mention 
beside physics. It was rather taken as something like a younger brother of physics, as the 
same type of science as physics, just a bit underdeveloped as compared to the ‘big brother’. 
The practical realist approach enables to strengthen the view that chemistry is definitely a 
science in its own right. More than that, chemistry need not be analysed taking physics as 
a model but a philosopher of science might act vice versa as well. The historically special 
position of physics among sciences may become better analysable on the background of 
physics’ relationship to chemistry. 
Chemistry provides us with a good basis for analysing the relationship between phys-
ics-like science and natural history. It is interesting that the existence of chemistry alone 
prevents us from identifying exact science with physics. We cannot take the position of 
physics as the only science proper for granted any longer. We cannot exclude the option 
that this analysis may even dethrone physics from its seemingly secure core position 
among all versions of science. 
The latter brings us into contact with one of the basic philosophical questions about 
social science. Is it reasonable to try to keep physics as a model of science even for social 
science? It looks as so far philosophers have rather been looking for a yes-no solution here. 
However, it may be that a dual type of approach to social science is more reasonable. Parts 
of social science (in the broad sense) can make good use of mathematics, for instance. 
Therefore, we could even speak about some remote physics-likeness here. However, any 
kind of social science cannot come close to the model of ϕ-science. Social science is not 
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natural history either. It rather connects to social history. Thus, mainly social science could 
probably be a kind of social philosophy of a practical type, attempting to figure out the 
major problems human societies as well as individuals are facing and suggesting solutions 
where and when possible. A modified practical realism might work for social science as 
well, although Vihalemm himself would perhaps not agree with this.
The history of chemistry is a good example how a cognitive approach to nature evolved 
into science (in the modern sense). Physics, in the form of classical mechanics, was born 
parallel to this evolvement. Modern physics started as pure science and therefore it initially 
became the model. Or rather, the methods of classical mechanics became the role model 
for the whole science. However, non-classical and especially post-non-classical physics 
are not really entirely pure exact science in the classical sense. One just needs to consider 
the changing role of the experiment, the problems with reproducibility (Müürsepp 2012) 
in order to see this. Interestingly, even in the context of the experiment, chemistry takes 
up a significant, perhaps even the leading position. Chemical experiments expose better 
the need to drop the requirement of reproducibility and the reversibility of time even in 
exact science. Normally, different chemical experiments directed at creating new stuff 
don’t develop in the same way. Similarity can be detected just on the level of patterns.
Vihalemm’s understanding of the experiment has been nicely presented in the main 
theses of practical realism. It is a theory guided manipulative material interference with 
nature. We cannot have experimental research where such kind of manipulative material 
interference is not possible. Manipulation means constructing. Therefore, there cannot be 
a non-experimental ϕ-science and not even a non-experimental science of dual character 
in the sense of chemistry. 
However, let us still take a look into the character of biology. We have to admit that con-
temporary biology provides us with a similar situation like chemistry to some extent at least, 
especially as far as molecular biology and genetics are concerned. That side of biology has the 
essence of a ϕ-science. Thus, strictly speaking, biology is also a science of a dual character. 
It will be very interesting to follow from the philosophical point of view the forthcoming 
developments in biology. At this point, biology does not really compare with chemistry yet 
concerning its impact as a science of dual character. Vihalemm explains that in biology the 
resistance of the material is too strong (Vihalemm 2015: 111). The material here would be 
living matter. Dealing with life, biology cannot really obtain the constructive character similar 
to physics and chemistry. It has to remain based on the classifying-historico-descriptive type 
of cognition, to remain a non-ϕ-science. However, there may be the tendency to become a 
science that is closer to chemistry. After all, there is biochemistry that deserves also special 
philosophical attention. Let that remain, however, a topic for further analyses.
Back to the Special Position of Chemistry,  
Making it even more Special 
As we know already, there are other thinkers in addition to Vihalemm, who have noticed 
the dual character of chemistry. Bernadette Bensaude-Vincent and Jonathan Simon, for 
instance, have interesting observations. They call chemistry an archetypal techno-science 
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because it cannot restrict itself to pure theory but always engages with productive practice 
(Bensaude-Vincent, Simon 2008: 5). At first, this seems a quite different dualism com-
pared to Vihalemm’s. However, Bensaude-Vincent and Simon also point out an aspect 
of chemistry that supports the practical realist understanding of science. The authors 
emphasise that throughout the last couple of centuries, physics has promoted pure theory 
over other forms of science (Bensaude-Vincent, Simon 2008: 5). Actually, it’s probably 
even longer than that as we hinted above. As physics had the position of the role model, 
anything practical concerning science became an indication of being away from the ide-
al. Research in chemistry, however, reminds us about the practical side of science. We 
know already that Bensaude-Vincent and Simon observed that in chemistry theory and 
substance are co-produced by the chemist in the laboratory (Bensaude-Vincent, Simon 
2008, 6). This idea takes Bensaude-Vincent and Simon close to practical realism and 
other ideas of Vihalemm. The produced substance (or stuff) is not constructed. It is a real 
product of chemistry and dealing with it bases on the classifying-historico-descriptive 
type of cognition. 
In order to specify the position of their account in philosophy of science, Bensau-
de-Vincent and Simon introduce the term ‘operational realism’. They emphasise that the 
term was coined under the influence of the chemists’ activities in the laboratory and add 
an ambitious belief that the basics of the philosophy of science will be rethought under the 
influence of their approach (Bensaude-Vincent, Simon 2008: 8). They mean that chemistry 
looks well suited to overtake the position of the most typical science. 
There is nothing surprising that chemists mostly work in the laboratory and therefore 
chemistry is a practical science almost by definition. However, it takes more than this 
to explain the special practical-operational status of chemistry that makes it a technical 
science. The ϕ-science non-ϕ-science dichotomy may look similar to the theoretical prac-
tical one. This is how Bensaude-Vincent and Simon see the hybrid nature of chemistry 
as they sometimes call it. For Bensaude-Vincent and Simon chemistry is impure exactly 
because of its tendency to look for practical results and solutions or applications. Here 
is the point of connection with technology and engineering science. The latter always 
aims at practical applications. Bensaude-Vincent and Simon see the same driving force 
in chemistry, although just in some part of it. Chemistry is a constant mix of science and 
technology that they understand along the lines of the theoretical practical mix. 
As mentioned above, Bensaude-Vincent and Simon call their approach ‘operational 
realism’. It is interesting to observe, what is the relationship between practical realism of 
Vihalemm and operational realism of Bensaude-Vincent and Simon? The main theses of 
practical realism are clearly in place (see above). Operational realism has not been spelled 
out in such a plain manner. There may be the question about the realist nature of practical 
realism. However, this question is more obvious in the case of operational realism. In the 
case of practical realism there is a similarity with the internal realism of Hilary Putnam. 
However, this kind of similarity makes practical realism even more a realism in a way. 
Operational realism, on the other hand, can be confused with instrumentalism. Still, 
Vihalemm thinks that there is a clear difference. Instrumentalism traditionally applies to 
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anti-realist philosophical positions, which treat theories as conventional tools, constructs 
of the human mind (Vihalemm 2015, 108). Chemists, however, normally don’t question 
the reality of their tools. Bensaude-Vincent and Simon call this an intimate relationship 
between practical activity and realism (2008: 209). Thus, Bensaude-Vincent and Simon 
are almost saying themselves that their approach is actually practical realism.
Perhaps it is not fully appropriate to call chemistry a technical science, at least in the 
direct sense of the term, but the methodological similarity of chemistry to engineering 
science in general terms even strengthens the claim of chemistry to become a science of 
very special interest to the philosophy of science. It connects physics-like science with not 
physics-like natural science in an interesting way and enables to add engineering science 
into the picture. These considerations might mean that we should develop a replacement 
for the model of ϕ-science and call it χ-science instead. At this point however, the latter 
conception is obviously underdeveloped in order to become fully established. Remem-
bering some conference discussions and personal conversations with Vihalemm, we must 
admit that the idea of χ-science did not become acceptable to him.
Conclusion
In the current paper, we have followed Vihalemm in his footsteps throughout his career 
from his early book about the history of chemistry through the two understandings of 
human cognition and the conception of ϕ-science to the exposition and short analysis of 
the original account of science called practical realism. In addition to reiterating the main 
ideas of Vihalemm, we have tried to clarify some more complicated issues, especially in the 
context of practical realism. The core of the whole paper, however, is the special character 
of chemistry that was masterfully exposed by Vihalemm throughout his career. Our hope is 
that the paper gives more weight to the idea that chemistry is a special kind of science due 
to its clearly exposed dual character. Thus, chemistry is definitely of special interest to the 
philosophers of science and chemistry. In addition, clarifying the essence of chemistry will 
help to analyse philosophically the long lasting understanding of physics as the only science 
proper and may lay foundations to considerable changes in the whole philosophy of science.
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